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Suggested Rewarding for Alternative 3

our intelligence system consists of five major intelligence producing and collecting agencies, each of which is essential to the intelligence structure. Their basic functional responsibilities are broadly determined by law and many of the detailed functional lines are drawn by bilateral or multilateral agreements or through the mechanism of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by DCIDs. Only the National Security Council, however, can limit or define functions by direction within the framework of the law. Insofar as the function is specifically assigned by law, directive, or agreement, it is incumbent on the responsible agency to budget for the complete performance of that function.

Agency to assure the clear definition and assignment of intelligence activities relating to the national security on a continuing basis, with a statutory duty to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of intelligence activities where necessary. If the ideal were achieved in this respect, no budgeting problem would arise unless the Congress saw fit, in appropriating funds, to reduce specific requests. Obviously in a field as fluid and complex as intelligence, this ideal will never be realised. There will be border-lines, apparent overlaps, and undefined areas where the budget responsibility is not clearly ascertainable. This necessarily arises out of the separation of statutory responsibilities. The departments are directed to continue their departmental intelligence functions and

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the Central Intelligence Agency is held responsible for intelligence activities relating to the national security.

agencies involved and with the assistance of the Bureau of the Budget much can be done to assure that activities important to the over-all intelligence function are not left without proper financial support. This is not central budgeting which would cut across command channels and which would, in effect, put the cart before the horse by putting the emphasis on budget rather than on functional definition. Nor is it an easy answer to the problem, as it is extremely difficult to anticipate and ascertain the areas of activity requiring this type of support. However, the intelligence structure has now gained some years of practical experience in this field and should be in a position to take the necessary action within the accepted principles of Government operations. Reinbursement under normal authorities will play its part in such action.